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CONSTITUTIONAL ETIQUETTE AND  
THE FATE OF “SUPREME COURT TV” 
Bruce Peabody* † 
In traditional media outlets, on the Internet, and throughout the halls of 
Congress, debate about whether the Supreme Court should be required to 
televise its public proceedings is becoming more audible and focused. To 
date, these discussions have included such topics as the potential effects of 
broadcasting the Court, the constitutionality of Senator Arlen Specter’s cur-
rent congressional initiative, S. 344, and how the public would use or abuse 
televised sessions of our highest tribunal. 
But almost entirely ignored in these conversations is an issue that may 
effectively determine the fate of S. 344: Will this initiative unsettle suppos-
edly time-honored relations of respect and civility between the judiciary and 
Congress—a pattern of institutional courtesy we might label “constitutional 
etiquette”? In order to answer this question, we need to understand the con-
cept of constitutional etiquette and its application to the contemporary 
debate about “Supreme Court TV.” The following discussion briefly defines 
constitutional etiquette, assesses whether Congress would breach that eti-
quette by enacting the legislation proposed by Senator Specter, and 
concludes by examining the significance—for the Specter bill and for our 
public affairs generally—of our branches’ mutual expectations of respect 
and deference. 
A little over a year ago, Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Tho-
mas appeared before a House Appropriations subcommittee. Their 
testimony included criticism of initiatives that would obligate the Court to 
televise its proceedings. As Kennedy remarked, the Justices “feel very 
strongly that we have an intimate knowledge of the dynamics and the needs 
of the court.” The current proposals, he argued, “which would mandate di-
rect television in [the] court in every [public] proceeding [are] inconsistent 
with that deference, that etiquette, that should apply between the branches.”  
The Court’s reluctance to set foot in the television age is unsurprising. 
The Justices’ high regard for traditional modes of conducting Court business 
can be seen in their donning of robes and providing “quill pen” keepsakes to 
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the advocates who engage in oral argument. Indeed, the Court has only re-
cently begun making oral argument accessible to the general public in a 
timely and direct manner. Last year, the Court decided to make transcripts of 
oral argument available to the public on a same day basis, and since 2000 it 
has also released a handful of audiotapes of these proceedings on a similar 
basis. 
The Court may also be especially interested in maintaining relationships 
with the other branches based on “deference” and “etiquette” because the 
Court noticeably lacks the powers of the sword and the purse. But what, 
specifically, does Justice Kennedy’s overture to constitutional etiquette actu-
ally mean—and how does it apply to S. 344? 
The answer to these questions is initially elusive, because neither Justice 
Kennedy nor others making variations of this basic argument have spelled 
out what constitutional etiquette comprises. Nevertheless, we might con-
struct a working definition by drawing on general features of etiquette used 
in social rather than political or legal contexts. 
Broadly speaking, etiquette refers to informal rules of behavior, not nec-
essarily written or codified, that apply to a specific group and serve some 
social and unifying objective, generally by providing perceived benefits to 
the parties who abide by these norms of cooperation. Etiquette is primarily 
internally enforced: the adherents of the rules of etiquette, not some external 
body, establish and maintain its dictates. 
Moving from this general conception, we might define constitutional 
etiquette as referring to norms of behavior that apply to the three branches 
of federal government and help sustain constitutional governance. The rules 
of constitutional etiquette, while not legal requirements, help create an envi-
ronment in which each branch can fulfill its duties with the expectation that 
the other branches will accede to some extent. 
For example, there is no constitutional requirement that the executive 
and legislative branches recognize Supreme Court decisions as binding be-
yond the parties to a case. But, as scholars such as Larry Alexander and 
Frederick Schauer have argued, the traditional willingness of these branches 
to acknowledge the Court’s authority to establish general precedents and 
legal norms promotes a system of stable and unifying rules useful to all 
three branches and the citizenry. The Court justifies its own “political ques-
tion” doctrine on similar terms. As the Court noted in United States v. 
Munoz-Flores, that doctrine purportedly prevents the judiciary “from inap-
propriate interference in the business of the other branches.” Justice Souter 
further explained in his concurrence to Nixon v. United States that the judi-
ciary owes considerable deference to legislative acts involving the 
impeachment or trial of judges or executive officials. Judicial review of an 
impeachment proceeding would violate the political question doctrine by 
stepping into the domain of a respected, coordinate branch; even “under the 
best of circumstances[, it would] entail significant disruption of govern-
ment.” 
We might distill four basic characteristics of constitutional etiquette that 
are reminiscent of its conventional, social analogue. First, constitutional 
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etiquette is firmly rooted in historic comity and cooperation between our 
federal institutions.  
Second, each branch’s continued acceptance of relevant rules is crucial 
to the preservation of constitutional etiquette. Constitutional etiquette gains 
credence from the reciprocal support of all three branches, and, in turn, it 
generally must provide each branch with some perceived benefits. 
Third, and closely related to this last point, constitutional etiquette is not 
strictly a legal phenomenon. In the United States, legal rules—conventionally 
established through legislative acts and judicial opinions—are generally for-
mal and written, exhibiting characteristics largely antithetical to the practical, 
institutional give-and-take embodied by the “softer” norms of constitutional 
etiquette. In contrast with legal rules, our constitutional manners are main-
tained by the informal accommodation, compromises, personal appeals, and 
deal-making of officials in all three branches of government.  
Finally, constitutional etiquette enables institutional cooperation by fos-
tering a hospitable and stable environment. In this way, constitutional 
etiquette mitigates the rough-and-tumble that ordinarily characterizes sepa-
ration of powers politics. This etiquette represents the inversion of our 
revered assumption, described in Federalist No. 51, that American politics 
depends upon “ambition” being made “to counteract ambition.” The District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals alluded to a similar point when it 
stated in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. that our 
framers believed 
that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate 
branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the 
dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective func-
tioning of our governmental system. Under this view, the coordinate 
branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to one an-
other when a conflict in authority arises. Rather, each branch should take 
cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accom-
modation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting 
branches in the particular fact situation . . . the resolution of conflict be-
tween the coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an 
opportunity for a constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes 
the functioning of our system. 
With this background in mind, let us return to Justice Kennedy’s chal-
lenge of S. 344. Is Senator Specter’s bill inconsistent with the deference and 
etiquette that should apply between the branches? Presumably, Specter’s 
proposal violates an implicit norm giving the judiciary control of its internal 
operations. But, as a matter of history and practice (not to mention law), 
there is no such rule. As many commentators have noted, Congress has long 
controlled (and varied) the size of the Court, created positions that support 
the work of the Court (among them, law clerks and the Court marshal), and 
dictated rules for establishing seniority and a quorum within the nation’s 
highest court. 
But Justice Kennedy could conceivably have in mind a more general 
principle of etiquette. Perhaps his objection is to Congress’s lack of regard 
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for the several Justices who publicly have opposed televised Court proceed-
ings. As a historical matter, Congress generally has been reluctant to pass 
measures deemed to interfere with the independence of the Court and its 
members. 
Senator Specter, interestingly, has addressed this claim directly by turn-
ing it on its head. In an April 2006 Washington Post op-ed, Specter wrote 
that Kennedy and Thomas “insisted that Congress should mind its own 
business and respect the court’s autonomy, just as the court has respected 
Congress’s autonomy.” But, he asked, “does the Supreme Court respect 
Congress?” In answering his own question, Specter pointed to a number of 
recent cases in which the Court invalidated popular federal legislation, con-
cluding that “there is no doubt that congressional procedures and authority 
have been severely diminished by the court.” In essence, Specter argued that 
his bill was an appropriate response to the Court’s disruption of longstand-
ing relations of deference and accommodation between the judicial and 
legislative branches. 
So how does greater awareness of constitutional etiquette help us under-
stand the fate of S. 344 and other facets of American political life? To begin 
with, legislators’ perceptions of whether the television bill breaches estab-
lished rules of deference and respect between the Court and Congress will 
inform the congressional debate and the ensuing vote. Congress will play a 
decisive role in deciding whether the bill is compatible with the informal 
norms that guide our national politics. Moreover, this debate will influence 
the response the bill receives from interest groups, the president (who could, 
of course, veto the measure), and, finally, the courts. 
More broadly, the discussion of the television proposal serves as a re-
minder that these are important times at the Supreme Court—because of the 
high bench’s role not only in construing our individual liberties and defining 
the contours of executive and congressional power, but also in shaping in-
creasingly contentious judicial-legislative relations. In recent years, 
members of Congress from both parties have shown greater willingness to 
criticize the Court and support various “Court-curbing” initiatives; among 
these are calls to remove certain topics from the high bench’s jurisdiction 
and to limit how long individual Justices can serve. While the Court has 
long enjoyed a great deal of independence and deference from the public 
and its elected representatives, this could conceivably change if our nation’s 
lawmakers effectively make the case that the Court has violated the comity 
that the “people’s branch” is due. 
Exploring constitutional etiquette in light of the apparently evolving 
status of judicial-legislative relations is all the more important given an 
emerged consensus in legal scholarship and political science that the effec-
tiveness of the Court—and especially its ability to protect individual 
rights—depends upon the willingness of Congress to promote and secure 
the Court’s decisions. Without bilateral respect and cooperation, the Justices 
may find their decision-making powers seriously compromised by legisla-
tive indifference or even resistance. 
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While the notion of constitutional etiquette can inform our understand-
ing of contemporary attacks on the Court by members of Congress, it can 
also help us comprehend the emergence of an arguably unhealthful form of 
deference practiced by legislators towards the high bench. Many of today’s 
members of Congress support “judicial supremacy,” the doctrine that the 
Court has a supreme—and, in some formulations, exclusive—duty to inter-
pret the Constitution. At the same time, contemporary constitutional 
scholars have argued forcefully that there are theoretical, historical, and 
pragmatic reasons for believing that members of Congress should take seri-
ously their own independent responsibilities to engage in constitutional 
interpretation. Given these claims, it is somewhat curious that judicial su-
premacy seems to be so widespread in Congress, both in terms of 
lawmakers’ expressed attitudes and their actual, deferential behavior.  
But we can partially account for this apparent disconnect by noting that 
Congress’s support for judicial supremacy may stem from its eagerness to 
recognize broad norms of constitutional etiquette. Indeed, research suggests 
that some members of Congress equate the Court’s core institutional respon-
sibilities with its possession of a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. 
As a result, deferential legislators may be ceding their own obligations to 
engage in constitutional interpretation in the interests of respecting what 
they (mistakenly) believe is a power exclusively held by the Supreme Court: 
that tribunal’s supposed authority to be the ultimate interpreter of our su-
preme law. 
In sum, we need more careful attention to and systematic study of con-
stitutional etiquette as a part of our investigation into the largely unseen 
“dark matter” that helps to hold our constitutional system together. Such an 
examination will help us, in the short run, to understand the political path of 
S. 344, and, more broadly, will provide us with a critical vantage point for 
assessing the ongoing health and sustainability of our Constitution. 
